Karl Barth leaves room by his own principles for further, even different thinking about Jews and gender (and, as a corollary, about homosexuality) than he records in the Dogmatics. Now that Marquardt, Klappert, Sonderegger, Soulen, and others have offered sympathetic critiques from a generally Barthian point of view, and Eberhard Busch has exhaustively laid to rest any biographical questions of Barth's relation to the Jewish people in his 1996 book, Unter dem Bogen des einen Bundes: Karl Barth und die Juden 1933Juden -1945, the way lies open to carry forward Barth's theological critique of nineteenth century theology and of abstraction further into the areas of Jews and gender, and to propose constructive pneumatological and exegetical supplements to his thinking. Barth's thinking on women and men, like his thinking on Jews, labors, for all its promise in its time, under a defect he calls abstraction. Barth faulted Calvin for abstracting both elect human beings and the electing God from Jesus Christ, whom Barth called the elect human being and the electing God in one. Yet on the election of the community Barth did not entirely escape the abstraction. In the manner of Augustine's Retractions, Barth wrote to Maruardt toward the end of his life that he had been so busy with (theological) Israel that he had had no time for the Jews. Does Barth, as Marquardt and Sonderegger suggest, throw up despite himself a conceptual screen onto which he at once projects an abstraction ("Israel") and behind which he hides actual human beings ("the Jews"), a screen resistant to the blowing of the Spirit? Do the concepts " man" and " woman" form a similar conceptual screen, dating from Schleiermacher's dialogue Christmas Eve, in which men and women (like Christians and Jews) have essentially different responses to the incarnation of Jesus Christ? Das ewig M??nnliche and das ewig Weibliche, inherited from German romanticism, see to run afoul of Barth's trinitarian particularism, as does " Israel". Yet further application of Barth's own principles, including more attention to the Spirit, leaves him more options in his treatment of Jews and gender, and richer exegesis -including exegesis by anagogy.
3. Most important, Barth found himself willing to accept, explicitly and without reservation, Marquardt's critique of his doctrine of Israel. He raised no objection even to Marquardt's harshest expressions. He rejected excuses. He encouraged improvements. Marquardt's book appeared in 1967. On September 5 of that year, at the very end of his life, Barth wrote Marquardt:
I have just finished reading your book. For two and one-half days it kept me holding my breath or breathless ....
You have discovered and expounded my doctrine of Israel with great skill and finesse, and historically and materially I can raise no objection. This doctrine of mine was ... impressing and convincing to me ... before I came to §5 ....
You had good cause to develop the criticism made in §5.1 can only say two things, not by way of excuse, but by way of explanation.
1. Biblical Israel as such gave me so much to think about and to cope with that I simply did not have the time or intellectual strength to look more closely at Baeck, Buber, Rosenzweig, etc. as you have now done in such worthy fashion.
2. I am decidedly not a philosemite, in that in personal encounters with living Jews (even Jewish Christians) I have always, so long as I can remember, had to suppress a totally irrational aversion, naturally suppressing it at once on the basis of all my presuppositions, and concealing it totally in all my statements, yet still having to suppress and conceal it. Pfui! is all I can say to this in some sense allergic reaction of mine.... A good thing that this reprehensible instinct is totally alien to my sons and other better people than myself (including you). But it could have had a retrogressive effect on my doctrine of Israel.
... May this not happen to you in the projected improvement of my first attempt! ... 11 Although a critique like Marquardt's is still controversial, it need not be. 12 1 seek to extend his critique of unintended Idealism from Jews to gender. I seek, more importantly, to expand the appeal to particularity from Christ to the Spirit, and to retrieve (not analogy but) anagogy alongside typology. (One of the four medieval senses, anagogy "leads up," reading the bible in light of the eschatological community, as when "Let there be light" means "let us be led into glory."") In so doing I prefer Barth to his defenders; I hope only to deploy a critique that Barth accepted and suggest improvements that Barth invited. My aim is less to rehearse the critique than to cast it in such a way as to suggest how to go on.
Three Further Objections
Even as a constructive project of retrieval, the approach invites three further objections.
1. Why attempt to cover Jews and gender in the same essay? They are two very large topics, and their relation, for Barth, seems distant at best.
Ironically enough, it is
Barth, according to Marquardt, who introduces natural theology into his doctrine of Israel. Defenders find the sting from Barth's portrayal of the Synagogue lessened, in that the Synagogue represents the sinfulness "only" of the human being as such. Yet because for Barth human pride first comes to light and is visible-empirical-in the history of the Jews-Marquardt can write that for Barth, "The Jews are the empirical and to this extent: [they become] the observable and effective representation of [the human] predicament; in other words, the Jews are for Barth the proof of the kernel of truth of natural theology within the revelation of grace." 16 Marquardt says that by way of observation, not criticism: it is not only a theological and biblical but a Barthian rationale revealing why the empirical is strictly appropriate in the case of the Jews. Barth allows a "demythologiza-tion"-or remythologization-not of Jesus, but of his people. Thus Barth not once but often and in complete seriousness offers the survival of the Jews as an empirical proof of God's existence, 17 as well as of human pride. Mar-quardt's observation, while not intended directly as criticism, does put Barth in a bind. Either it is not appropriate to adduce the empirical history of rabbinic Judaism, "the Synagogue," or there is a great deal more evidence to consider, including "Baeck, Buber, and Rosenzweig"-in short, Jewish selfunderstanding.
2. Although Barth elsewhere insists that empirical reality, the evidential significance of history, and the self-understanding of groups are never the defining object of dogmatic theology, he also refused to immunize his theology against their claims, and he did so long before the famous opening to the "little lights of creation" later in his work. The biblical system hermetically sealed off against the world is a parody of Barth, opposing his christology. Although the office of dogmatics is to test the proclamation of the church against the Word of God, not against empirical reality or evidential history, Barth raises and answers the question, already in CD 1/1: Can God speak through those other signs? Yes, of course; it is a matter of God's freedom; and yet God does not exercise freedom capriciously or abstractly, but according to God's own selfdetermination, or concretely, in a trinitarian pattern. On the pattern of the enhypostatic taking on of flesh by the Logos, the triune God assumes human words into the divine Word. 18 On the pattern of the founding of the church by the Spirit, the triune God baptizes human speakers into the divine community. If and when, therefore, God in freedom should speak to the church about its proclamation from empirical events or evidentiary history, God's speech does not remain external to God's Word, but is by definition internal to it-just as the incarnation confirms that human flesh is not external but internal to God, from the beginning of God's free selfdetermination to be God also for us. Empirical events and evidentiary history, should God assume them into the Word, do not break the rule that the community tests its proclamation by God's Word, but prove it. Similarly, groups whose self-understandings really call the church to account do not break the rule that God speaks within the community, but prove that the Spirit founds the community with just such a call. Circular? Yes indeed, Barth would say, and virtuously so, insofar as the circularity of the argument traces the trinitarian perichoresis. Thus we read:
[T]here can be nothing to prevent God from turning even such utterance concerning Him into proclamation of His Word to us which, in its character as sanctified utterance within the Church, is at first partially or even totally concealed from us. If the Church is visible, this need not imply that we actually see it in its full compass, that the dimensions of its sphere might not be very different from what we think we know them to be. God may suddenly be pleased to have Abraham blessed by Melchizedek, or Israel blessed by Balaam or helped by Cyrus.... He can establish the Church anew and directly when and where and how it pleases Him....
Hence it can never be the case that the Word of God is confined to the proclamation of the existing Church, or to the proclamation of the Church as known to us, or to the proclamation in this known Church which specially claims to be proclamation [i.e., in official or magisterial pronouncements]. Church proclamation itself, in fact, regards itself only as service of the Word of God, as a means of grace in God's free hand. Hence it cannot be master of the Word, nor try to regard the Word as confined within its own borders....
God may speak to us through Russian Communism, a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub, or a dead dog.... [T] he boundary between the Church and the secular world can still take at any time a different course from that which we think we discern.
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Nevertheless, a word from the outside is not self-validating, is not entitled to prophetic authority within the church, until tested by exegesis. To make the test is the task of dogmatics, "the wissenschaftlich self-examination of the Christian Church with respect to the content of its distinctive talk about God. That the cantankerous details of public reality urging reform of the church's proclamation about Jews and gender may belong to movements of the Spirit, emerges from their presence in not only the church unknown to Barthians, but even in the church known to them. For the church to listen to the experience of Jews and women and gay and lesbian people is not necessarily just another species of illicit natural theology, but a self-examination by some churches' own, internal doctrinal norms. That God wills the continued existence of Jews as an identifiable people, not absorbed into the Gentile mass, is now church dogma for large numbers of the faithful, 22 whom
Barth's doctrine must continue to interest. That homosexual persons are specially in need of pastoral care and deserving of further theological reflection is now the official position of the Catholic magisterium. 23 So moves the Spirit also within the church known to Barthians that excite it to test traditional views by renewed exegesis.
Several reasons outweigh the disadvantages of holding the topics of Jews and gender together.
1) The reception of Barth's views on both Jews and gender has undergone an about-face, reason enough to ask after connections (if not to find them). Despite Barth's confession that he was "no philosemite," no less a witness than Theodor Adorno regarded him as "grenzlos philosemitisch" 24 on the Jews, while others regarded him as innovative in rendering women constitutive of co-humanity with men. Yet now critics regard him with suspicions of a rhetoric positively medieval on the Jews and hopelessly hierarchical on women. 2 "
2) Critics regard the two reversals as related not accidentally but formally. Both critiques accuse Barth of throwing up a conceptual screen onto which he can project an abstraction (the Church and the Synagogue, Man and Woman) and hide real people (the Jews, men and women). Both question the Dogmatics' Realitätsbezug, or relation to reality. A critique Barth's defenders reject has acquired the Lukan urgency of the knocker persisting at midnight or the widow importuning the unjust judge.
3) Barth himself launched critiques of his theological predecessors with the charge of "abstraction." He made Luther and Calvin guilty of "abstraction" in their doctrine of election, Schleiermacher in his entire anthropology. Is Barth's worry the same or different? If similar, it raises the possibility of internal critique.
4) It would appear that Barth's own critique of abstraction has little in common with his detractors', since Barth defines the "real" differently-until we recall the distinctively Barthian critique of the nineteenth century, especially Schleiermacher, and that Barth's treatments of Jews and gender appear to reflect examined or unexamined but formally similar nineteenth-century Platonisms about das ewig Weibliche or der ewige Jude. Such Piatonisms may fall to an extension of Barth's own Schleiermacher-critique: Jews and gender belong together because they are both matters Barth picks up out of German romanticism, especially if they are matters he greatly, but incompletely, reworks.
5) Most interesting of all, Barth perceived and elevated a deep conjunction, even a marriage between the two topics, one quite different from the conjunction discerned by historians of oppression, and one he did not regard as a theological conceit or quaint anachronism, but as an ontological feature of God's covenant with humankind richly apt for theological elaboration: as creation is the external ground of the covenant, and covenant the internal ground of creation, so the love of man for woman is the external ground of God's love for Israel, and God's love for Israel the internal ground of man's love for woman. 26 6) That connection carries us deeply into Barth's greatest strategy for reading the Bible, namely typology. Of the four medieval senses, Barth pro-lifically practiced three-the literal, the typological, and the moral. One of the two disused ones, typology, he retrieved with great selfconscious satisfaction. It is the odder therefore that a work so rich in ecclesial reflection as the Church Dogmatics never reflects explicitly upon the other, anagogy, the ecclesial sense. Perhaps that is because it is also the eschatological sense, and Barth's eschatology went unfinished. Anagogy, seeing communities in the light of glory, proposes compatible supplements to Barth's pneumatology and exegesis.
The connection of Jews and gender lies deep in the structure of Barth's thought, in his inheritance from the 19th C. and in his critique of it, in his exegetical practice and in his trinitarian concreteness. Barth always took a lively interest in politics. Those features invest a political critique with theological interest. 27 
Barth's Critique of Abstraction
Barth's critique of abstraction does not, however, attempt in the first instance to attend to "empirical" reality, or descriptions of reality undisciplined by the Word of God in Christ. Barth would not say that a theology is abstract because it favors the biblical witness to Christ over empirical descriptions, or theological "Israel" over empirical "Jews." Rather he calls a theology abstract that favors empirical descriptions over the details of the biblical narratives. The "real" world for Barth is "the strange new world within the Bible." 28 The critique of abstraction does not address the problem of Realitätsbezug, as reality is commonly understood; rather it addresses theology's Realitätsbezug precisely as God in Christ defines what reality is. That means that Barth's critique of abstraction centers on such topics as trinitarian doctrine and biblical narrative. It does not ignore such topics as statistics and secular history, but may absorb them magisterially, as a center takes in its periphery, because the critique of abstraction aims not to constrain but to honor God's freedom, not to impoverish exegesis but to enrich it.
Let me give an example. Barth's most famous and successful innovation in all the Church Dogmatics is his reformulation of the doctrine of election. Barth diagnoses traditional doctrines of election as suffering under a twofold abstraction: an unknown electing God, a Deus absconditus whose ways are past finding out, whose freedom abstracts from love, and whose character abstracts from the revelation in Jesus Christ; and an unknown elected human being, the object of God's caprice and therefore at sea (e.g., CD II/2,103-104).
Latet periculum in generalibus:
we were forced to say this of the first error, and we must now repeat it with reference to the second. In the first case we were forced to challenge the general character of the proposed view of humanity. In the second, we must challenge the general character of the proposed concept of God. (CD II/2, 48-49; emphasis added)
Barth cures the twofold abstraction with a singular concreteness or particularity: Jesus Christ is the electing God and the elect human being in one. 29 ... In the doctrine of predestination we have to do with the understanding both of God and of the human being in particular: in the particular relationship in which God is the true God and the human being the true human being. Although Barth claims never to deploy a method, he does reveal a certain evaluative and constructive procedure in criticizing his predecessors and defending his innovation, marked by negative words like "absolute," which goes with "general" and "abstract," and positive words like "definition" and "determination," which go with "particular." From a large number of texts in CD II/2,1 pick out a number of features.
1) The particular attends to the story of Jesus. Not just any particularity will do. Barth inveighs against a particularity deduced "as a species from a genus" (CD II/2, 48), and against Calvin's "particular," i.e., empirical, interests (CD 11/2, 37). Nor is it even a christological principle or method, when the emphasis falls upon the nouns. Rather "In itself, and as such, the particular leads us to the general, which it includes within itself" (CD II/2,51; emphasis added). The particular is christological in a recognizable way; in Hegelian language, Christ is the concrete universal. 30 Yet Barth does not make Christ the concrete universal to pursue a Hegelian method or a Durk-heimian explication, however powerful they may be. Rather he finds the Hegelian-Durkheimian insight strictly appropriate to the peculiar character of God.
[T]he true God is the One whose freedom and love have nothing to do with abstract absoluteness or naked sovereignty, but who in His love and freedom has determined and limited Himself to be God in particular and not in general, and only as such to be omnipotent and sovereign and the possessor of all other perfections. (CD II/2, 49; emphasis added)
We know God in the particular human being Jesus Christ as he is available to us not even in dogma but in the text. As Barth wrote to Berkouwer, "in each individual theological question I seek to orientate myself afresh-to some extent from the very beginning-not to christological dogma but to Jesus Christ himself (viviti regnati triumphat!)." 31 2) Abstraction is at root an insufficiency in trinitarian thinking. While Barth explicates and defends the knowledge of God as particular by displaying that particularity in the biblical stories about Jesus Christ, he also explicates and elaborates the being of God as particular by reference to the Trinity. Thus in the doctrine of election, Barth accuses the Reformers of a trinitarian mistake; without intending to, they had proceeded as if the Father alone were the electing God, and not also the Son.
Particularity is trinitarian not so much textually in Barth as architectonically. In fact, the only places where the Trinity becomes a subject of explicit reflection in the doctrine of election warn that just as one can speak of Christ, but abstractly, so one can also speak abstractly of the Trinity. Barth causes the doctrine of the Trinity to arise from "the being of God as the One who loves in freedom" (title of §28); "a correct doctrine of election" (title of §32) arises from God's selfdetermination to be "for the human being too the One who loves in freedom" (Letitsatz of §32). So "the One who loves in freedom" is the hinge that connects the two halves of the doctrine of God together, CD II/l and 11/2, the being of God and the correctness of a doctrine of election. 3. Theology regards the mirrorings provided by empirical reality (ordinary sense) as distinctly dim; when Barth sees clearly, he relates "empirical" reality to the bible and sees types (correspondences to Christ). Types are precisely not the sorts of "abstractions" Barth inveighed against; they are the sort of concretions that gave his theology power. They are concrete because they press this reality into the strange new world within the bible, because they read everything as a type of Christ. To conclude, "theology regularly entails judgments about reality that go beyond or otherwise differ from what is 'empirically' available (e.g., human beings are created in the image of God)." The charge of going beyond the empirical is hardly to be avoided, short of redefining "empirical"; and it is hard to see why theologians should want to avoid it. 12 In what follows, therefore, I do not propose that theology do without judgments that reach beyond empirical reality, and I assume with Barth that the "really real" absorbs this world into the one depicted in the bible. Nevertheless, I also propose that Barth's readings of Jews and gender have room to become more concrete, more absorbed into the biblical text, related to Christ in a more complex way, specifically by his people and his Spirit. In particular, I will be proposing that Barth's critique of the 19th century insufficiently identified two of its abstractions, two of its failures to see reality in the mirror of Christ. It will not have escaped attentive readers of Marquardt's list that Barth accuses the Synagogue of being "a living petrification of the Old Testament in itself and in abstracto" \ Is it really in accord with Barth's doctrine that the elect people can actually succeed in "abstracting" themselves from God's self-determination to be for them-or can only theologians do that?
Besides-consideration of the Jews could scarcely count as natural theology, if their community is still a concern or a material mode of the Spirit. Either the doctrine of Israel is worse than we thought-it is a doctrine that there exists a group of human beings entirely natural, in hyperProtestant opposition to grace, entirely God-forsaken and Spirit-bereft-or Barth's pneumatology had grown fairly abstract, if he could refrain from protest against a doctrine of Israel characterized as natural theology-even as its kernel of truth within the revelation of grace!
Unintended Abstraction in Earth's Doctrine of Elect Pairs
Barth reformulates the doctrine of election by taking up all the traditional examples of individual elect and rejected human beings and even animals, setting them into pairs, and referring both, the elected and the rejected member, to Jesus Christ as their typological reference, since he is elect and the rejected human being in one, the rejected human being elected. It is a glorious change of subject from the usual elect-and-reprobate division, a brilliant un-asking of the question. All the things the orthodox predestinarians said are true, even about reprobation-if only they all apply first and para-digmatically not to individual human beings, but to Jesus Christ, and to others only "in him" (Eph. 1:4; CD II/2,110-115).
Thus when Barth finally comes, after some three hundred pages of turning the reader's attention to the election of Christ and the community, to "The Elect and the Rejected," there is no change of subject. Barth finds pairs of elect and rejected everywhere in the bible, all pointing to the rejected one elected, Jesus Christ. There he launches a litany to recover for fiercely christocentric usage the older doctrine of twin predestination, or praedestinatio geminai So we hear of the following pairs: Cain and Abel, Isaac and Ishmael, Rachel and Leah, Ephraim and Manasseh, Tamar and Judah, Perez and Zerah, the offering goat and the scapegoat, the slain bird and the released bird, Saul and David, the man of God of Judah and the prophet from Bethel, and finally Judas and Paul (CD II/2, 354-409, 458-506). In ringing the changes upon this theme Barth is not tone-deaf. The renditions abound in subtlety and depth. The elect and the rejected are allowed to intersect and change sides, and both-Saul no less than David-are types of Jesus Christ. In the famous long, small-print excursus on Judas (CD 11/2, 458-506), Barth shows Judas as one of the elect, the disciples; insists that he has completed the three traditional parts of contrition, contritio cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio opens; washes out any distinction between Judas and Peter, Judas and any of us, Judas and Paul; before concluding:
But to say this is to say all that we need to say about the general question of the divine will and intention for the rejected, the non-elect. The answer can only be as follows.
[God] wills that [the non-elect human being] too should hear the Gospel, and with it the promise of his election. He wills, then, that this Gospel should be proclaimed to him. He wills that he should appropriate and live by the hope which is given him in the Gospel.
He wills that the rejected should believe, and that as a believer he should become a rejected human being elected. The rejected one as such has no independent existence in the presence of God. He is not determined by God merely to be rejected. He is determined to hear and say that he is a rejected human being elected. This is what the elect of the New Testament are-rejected ones elected in and from their rejection, human beings in whom Judas lived, but was also slain, as in the case of Paul. They are rejected ones who as such are summoned to faith. They are rejected ones who on the basis of the election of Jesus Christ, and looking to the fact that He delivered Himself up for them, believe in their election. (CD II/2, 506)
This gives one a taste for rich biblical exegesis, from Cain and Abel to Judas and Paul, and for relentless christocentric focus.
But it can give one a taste for more riches. Christocentrism works well with dialectic. It is good at resolving pairs. In spite of great detail, in spite of its ability to adduce figures like Ephraim and Manasseh, Perez and Zerah, unknown to most theologians, in spite of its ability to evoke and incorporate a huge volume of biblical narrative, it has its limits. It does better with character than with plot. It does better with dialectic than with complication. It does better with individuals or groups treated individualistically, than with individuals in community. Even as it evokes and incorporates biblical narratives as no theologian has done since Luther, it also suppresses and flattens parts of them. Its subtlety is dialectical, not plotted; twofold, not circumstantial. It does not tell us how to talk about the means by which God works among others-third parties, circumstances, communities-to hold up the twinned pairs for display. Think of Rebecca tricking Isaac into blessing Jacob, Jonathan allying himself with David, the costuming of Tamar lying in wait for Judah, the dozens or thousands who surround and support the pairs. Barth can evoke these details-but he cannot exploit them. Or better: he cannot exploit them without referring much more often to that Trinitarian person to whom we appropriate the movements of hearts, and circumstances, and communities, who blows where it wills, and thus resists reduction into twofold categories, however skillfully plied: I mean the Spirit. Barth has whetted appetites for a radically theological reading of biblical narrative-whetted it in such a way that we want more. More is readily available. It is the overplus that the Spirit supplies, never apart from the Father and the Son, but enriching and celebrating them. It is the Spirit to whom we ascribe the plots and turns of biblical narrative, the circumstances and communities of biblical characters, the secondary causes that move their hearts in this world. Barth is richly open for this sort of elaboration, though he does not pursue it.
The Holy Spirit Can Alleviate the Unintended Abstraction
The condition for the possibility in God for "Jesus's existence, of the life of our brother-man/' is God's life as the One who loves in freedom in se before being that One also for us. It is because God loves in freedom already without us that we can know God in Jesus as loving in freedom now for us, not capriciously or abstractly but by God's own trinitarian self-determination, because God is in se as God does in Jesus; because God's loving in freedom is neither externally compelled nor spontaneously arbitrary, yet mysteriously and reliably characteristic. Thus we read in the stirring Leitsatz to §32: "The doctrine of election is the sum of the Gospel because of all the words that can be said or heard it is the best: that God elects the human being; that God is for the human being too the One who loves in freedom" (CD II/2, 3; emphasis added). The mystery and reliability of the One who loves in freedom is revealed and enacted and furthered in a real history with us human beings in the resurrection of Jesus. God proves free to restore the love between the Father and the Son, even in the face of death. Barth stops there-it is enough -he has explicated the doctrine of election with the doctrine of atonement. But he might have gone further. He might have completed the doctrine of election not only in terms of the Second Person but also in terms of the Third. 34 Precisely as God proves free to restore the love between God the Father and God the Son identified with sinful human flesh, God is free also to celebrate and glorify and consummate that love by catching us up into it. God's loving in freedom is not without celebration, glorification, and delight, not without the sort of communal joy that feasts and weddings grant to love. To do that is the intratrinitarian role of the Spirit. It is therefore not necessary, but it is both gracious and fitting for God to catch us up into it. To do that is the appropriate work of the Spirit (Rom. 8:11). God the Father is not to be separated from God the Son; classical predestinarians drove in a wedge there. And human incorporation into that inseparable relationship is not to be separated from the work of the Spirit. Although the solution is resolutely christocentric, Barth does not fail to mention the Spirit. God's being as the One who loves in freedom is explicated by the Trinity, and election simply describes the turn of the One who loves in freedom toward us human beings in Christ not without the Spirit. It is the chief end of the human being, for Barth as for the opening answer of the Westminster Confession, "to glorify God and enjoy Him forever," but that is what the Spirit does already in the Trinity ( § §12, 18). 35 So human beings can glorify God because in so doing the Holy Spirit catches them up into its proper work of glorifying the love between the Father and the Son. As Rowan Williams puts it:
The whole story of creation, incarnation and our incorporation into the fellowship of Christ's body tells us that God desires us, as if we were God, as if we were that unconditional response to God's giving that God's self makes in the life of the trinity. We are created so that we may be caught up in this; so that we may grow into the wholehearted love of God by learning that God loves us as God loves God. The life of the Christian community has as its rationale-if not invariably its practical reality-the task of teaching us this ... 36 No work of the triune God can be without the celebration and witness of the Spirit, since then the love of the Father and the Son would be isolated, lonely, lacking in the richness that the parables of Jesus portray, like a wedding without a celebration, a marriage without a witness, a feast without a guest. 37 Nothing requires that human beings celebrate the wedding, witness the marriage, enjoy the feast; in the Spirit God enjoys all those things, already rich. 38 But by the same Spirit it is not foreign to God, but characteristic of God-particularly characteristic of this God, the one who is not without the Spirit-to catch us up into those things. It would mean a greater openness to the complications and details of the stories, the ways in which the Spirit moves not just pairs of people, but the communities and environments around them, to construct typological relationships, so that supporting actors and circumstances and growth and reversal and plot come into play-or, to put it into more theological language, so that one attends more to community or church and providence and sanctification and resurrection, not just "the rejected" and "the elect. We may sum up like this. Barth did not abhor abstraction for its own sake. Barth abhorred it just as it impugned the character of the One who loves in freedom as revealed in Jesus Christ. The Father's freedom may not be compromised by a love without reception and response. That is true both antecedently in se, as the Father loves the Son, and also for us, in the Son's appropriated work of reconciling us by atonement to share in their love ( § §11, 13, 33) . Such an abstraction would finally amount to the heresy that Jesus is not the Lord.
The same move is inalienable from the Spirit. The Father and the Son may not be abstracted from Spirit; their love may not go unwitnessed, unblessed, uncelebrated, undelighted in. So too the being of the One who loves in freedom may not be abstracted from that One's gracious selfdetermination to be the One who loves in freedom by freeing for love. 40 That is true both antecedently in se, as the Spirit liberates the love of the Father and the Son for fruitfulness and joy, and also for us, in the Spirit's appropriated work of liberating us by sanctification and gathering to share in their fruitfulness and joy ( § §12, 67, 68). 41 Such an abstraction can tend toward the heresy that the Spirit is not the Lord.
George Hunsinger has written:
It would be abstract in Barth's sense to speak of the Father and the Son in separation from the Holy Spirit. Whether Barth is actually guilty of such an abstraction is, I think, difficult to say. Merely to leave the work of the Holy Spirit implicit or undiscussed is not necessarily to be guilty of abstraction, though it may make Barth guilty of neglect. To make him guilty of abstraction on this score, one would need to show that discussing the work of the Holy Spirit more explicitly (in a way that Barth could accept, assuming that one is still striving for an internal critique) would somehow radically alter or supplement what Barth does manage to say. 42 The supplements would be: to speak of God's self-determination in covenant with Israel as seriously as God's self-determination in covenant with Jesus Christ, not on a two-covenants theory, but on a one-covenant theory where the gap is stressed between the cause of the covenant in Christ's atoning work, and the guarantee of the covenant to Israel in the promise to Abraham.
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And to deploy anagogy as seriously as typology.
Unintended Abstraction in Earth's Doctrine of Israel
Barth's §34, "The Election of the Community," is remarkable for explaining to Protestants-and to a lesser extent to Christians generally-what Jews have never forgotten and what Christians should have been unable to miss: most of the election talk in the bible is about an elect community? 44 Undergraduates typically suppose that "chosenness" (used of Israel) and "predestination" (used of individuals) are two separate things-and students are not so culpable in that supposition: generations of Christian theologians have taught and stupefied them with it. Furthermore, Barth insists with Romans 11, but against much of the Christian tradition and the particular anti-Semitism of the Nazis, that the election of Israel is secure. The Church and Israel comprise one elect community, the environment of the Messiah. Barth is the father of many latetwentieth century doctrines of Israel that improve on him (Klappert, Marquardt, Wyschogrod), yet continues to be more important than they. Even though the polemic against abstraction continues into §34, abstraction returns with alternately renewed and mitigated virulence in "The Election of the Community." Instead of the unknown human being, elect and rejected, we get an unknown human community, the human being in its "passing and coming" form. We get again an unknown God in Barth, too, one who can change his mind on us, making a covenant that supersedes the old. It is another Deus absconditus, a God who has absconded from the covenant at Sinai. For according to Barth, although God honors Jews, God no longer honors Judaism.
To be sure, Barth thinks he has avoided the abstraction of the human being. Barth means Israel, not as an abstraction but as a biblical and christo-logical concretion of the human being in its passing form. Barth means the church, not as an abstraction but as a biblical and christological concretion of the human being in its coming form. Both of those communities, furthermore, are empirically identifiable. And both of them, as before, are types of Jesus Christ, who passes through death and comes again. Furthermore, Barth is not supersessionist in one sense, because he upholds the covenant with Abraham.
We should be suspicious of that defense because Calvin (say) might have defended himself similarly on the doctrine that Barth marshals the critique of abstraction to demolish. Calvin might also have said that the human being in its rejected form is represented by the unregenerate, in its elect form by the true church. In spite of disclaimers in his better moments, Calvin too at least sometimes thought the groups empirically identifiable, and he would certainly have had no trouble seeing them as representative of biblical types. Therefore, the classical doctrine too, Calvin might complain, was sufficiently "concrete." What Calvin would not be able to claim is that the doctrine sufficiently protects concreteness in the sense of Jesus Christ as the elect one.
What Barth is not able to claim is similar: that the doctrine of the election of the community sufficiently protects concreteness in the sense of the Holy Spirit as the electing God and the immanent electedness of human communities, or immanent in the Church. 45 And precisely because it is communities we are talking about here, one would expect Barth to talk about the Holy Spirit as the one to whom we appropriate their gathering, upbuilding, and holiness, as elsewhere he does, and does at length. But not here. As Barth is less able to particularize the community by reference to the Spirit's work, so he is less able to identify God by the Spirit's work.
What does it mean to identify God by the Spirit's work? Two things.
1. It means to identify God by God's self-commitment in covenant not, this time, to the human being in Jesus Christ, but to the human community in Israel. More broadly, the promise to Abraham was that he would be a father of many nations, by which they would bless themselves, by which, that is, they would become for one another a source not of hostility but of mutual blessing. 46 2. It means, second, to identify God by scriptural exegesis not, this time, typologically focused on Jesus Christ, but anagogically focused on the perfect community, the heavenly Jerusalem, the consummation for which Christians daily pray, "thy kingdom come." To identify God by Jesus Christ is to refuse abstraction from God's concrete self-determination to be for human beings in him, and thus to practice typological exegesis. To identify God by the Holy Spirit is to refuse abstraction from God's concrete self-determination to be for Israel, and thus to practice anagogical exegesis.
It is Robert Jenson who has suggested that to identify God by the Spirit's work is to identify God by the Spirit's agency in the church; but "the personal agent of this work in fact turns out at every step of Barth's argument to be not the Spirit, as advertised, but Christ; the Spirit is denoted invariably by impersonal terms. The Spirit is 'the power of Jesus Christ's being.'" 47 The Spirit is God's power, but not God's act. The sheer potential here echoes the sheer potential of the Father in Reformation doctrines of election, with similar abstraction. The abstract human being that Barth denied was unrelated to God, was not christologically defined, was indeed god-forsaken, in that God had no prior commitment to that human being, or better, no prior commitment of God's own to that human being, so that God was "free" to exercise caprice. God's "relation" to the human being was not personal, but potential; it was a matter of abstract power.
If the abstraction here of Father and Son from the Spirit is similar to the abstraction there of Father from Son, then we can have all sorts of talk of the Spirit that proves ineffective, as earlier accounts of election made Christ not the concretely elected God and elected human being in one, but the much-discussed instrument of the Father's caprice. Similarly, we should expect to find a community abstracted from the Spirit, as before we found a human being abstracted from the Son.
An abstraction of the Spirit would be similar. God's "relation" to the human community is not personal, but potential; it is a matter of abstract power. The "power" even "of Jesus Christ" is still an abstraction if not bound to "the act of a particular community." In this case, for Barth, God has a future relation to Israel, but Israel is not identifiable, since God has (for Barth) no future relation to the material community of the Synagogue. 48 It is "the Old Testament in abstracto" for Barth, the "passing" form of the human being. It is, for Barth, what Jews need to be saved from. Precisely to the extent that Barth's "Synagogue" is that which human beings are saved from, it is Spirit-bereft, just as the rejected in the Reformed system were Christ-bereft. Barth does not say that the Spirit has ignored the Jews, to be sure. He includes them into the community of Jews and Gentiles which is the church, humanity's coming form. Yet precisely that leaves the Synagogue an abstract absence of good, an abstract Spirit-less-ness, as the rejected were an abstract Christless-ness. Despite all disclaimers, that seems to be the logic of the matter, despite so many epicycles and protests. And yet if God knows the human being only in Christ, Barth complained, there is really no such thing as a Christ-less human being. Is there no such thing as a Spirit-less human community?
God is free to keep faith with Jews, because the eschatological community will consist of Jews and Gentiles. But Barth's identification of Jews who continue to act identifiably as Jews, who concretely keep faith with God's self-commitment to them, as humanity's "passing form" does not easily express the concreteness of that freedom. Soulen uses the phrase "Israelforgetfulness": it means that God's history with Jesus so overwhelms God's history with Israel, that the latter becomes indecisive for God's identity. 49 One would not normally say that Barth's theology suffers from Israel-forgetfulness. But does Israel's history continue to be decisive for the identity of God, if Israel ceases to live a life of its own, coming merely to represent or to mirror, in the terms of a German Idealism that Barth otherwise eschewed, humanity's "passing" form? Barth's Israel-anthropology sounds less general than Schleiermacher's, because it seems to be a biblical rather than an Enlightenment anthropology. 50 But is it really? Is the Holy Spirit, the bond of fidelity between Father and Son, still free to keep faith with circumcision? Is the Holy Spirit, the bond of community within the Trinity, still free to build community with the God of Israel at Passover? If not, does God not pass over the community to which God was bound and abandon it (for reasons of sin) just as the Reformers' God passed over and abandoned the abstract human rejected (for reasons of sin)? If Israel's history is humanity's passing form, does it not become something human beings are saved from, rather than the bearer of the consummation that human beings are saved for? 51 "Its mission as a natural community has now run its course and cannot be continued." 52 If there should be no abstract piling up of sin upon the rejected human being, then should there be an abstract piling up of sin upon the rejected community, humanity's passing form? The continuing existence of Jews is emphatically God-willed for Barth, but not the continuing existence of the practices that constitute and build up and set apart the community that alone makes Jews concretely identifiable, the community of Judaism.
The Spirit is able to keep faith with God's covenants. God is able to be constant. God past and present are creatively the same. The Spirit who frees God to be creatively and livingly the One God, the Spirit who guarantees the unity of God, the Spirit who reunited the Father and the Son at the resurrection, still keeps faith. God's very unity is confirmed in the face of threat, as the Spirit confirmed it after one of the Persons suffered death on the cross. A God who cannot keep faith is just as much an unknown God as one who makes arbitrary decisions; a God who keeps faith with a covenant community is concrete in the fidelity of the Spirit. "The gospel's reliability among the Jews is the precondition of its identifiability among the Greeks." 53 Those are things Barth would like to say-and does say. "It is not any other people, nor the totality of others, but the Jews who are the universal horizon of each and all peoples." 54 The question is whether the language of humankind's "passing form" and the relative absence of Spirit-talk allow him to do so as effectively as possible.
The Holy Spirit Supplements Earth's Doctrine of Israel, Because Consummation is Especially Appropriate to the Spirit

In her marvelous book, That Jesus Christ Was Born a Jew: Karl Barth's Doctrine of Israel,
Katherine Sonderegger argues that the problem in Barth's doctrine of the elect community is that he conceives it on the pattern of justification. 55 One community must represent the sinner, the other the righteous; the combined community of God, the environment of Jesus Christ, represents the sinner justified, as he does. The sinner is the passing, the justified one the coming human being. Israel represents sin, the Church redemption. But such a canonical construal remains pneumatologically abstract, no matter how many supporting details one adduces.
According to George Lindbeck, the biblical witness is that the Church and Israel are types, but not of Christ: they are types (anagogues) of the people of God in fellowship with God at the end of time. 56 If Barth were still alive, and now had time for the Jews, he could notice the amazing (or perhaps not so amazing) thing that Jewish theologians can have the same eschatology as Paul: at the end, when the Messiah comes, the Gentiles will become part of the people of God without having to observe Torah. (So Novak in The Election of Israel) Lindbeck suggests that the two become compatible even about "when the Messiah comes", if we recall that for Christians the Messiah comes twice 57 -or if, as Stan Stowers suggests as a reading of Romans, the one mission of the Messiah is split into two moments for the salvation of the world. 58 In any case, the type of the people of God that both Israel and the Church indubitably represent (however they relate to Christ) is most easily appropriated to the concreteness of the Spirit. The gathering and setting apart and consummation of the community is the work of the triune God appropriated to the Spirit.
Furthermore, precisely the continued God-willed distinction of Gentile Christians and Jews that Barth favors might lead one to this observation: that while God's history with the nations is easily parsed as a type of redemption-since God so graciously and surprisingly includes them in the one covenant with Abraham-God's biblically recorded history with Israel is less so. For Gentiles, the main plot of the biblical story is redemption, with consummation as an unexpected further benefit 59 : so the Paschal benediction in the Roman order: felix culpa, quae tantum ac talent meruit habere Redemptorem! 60 But for Jews the main plot of the biblical story is about the community and the promises made to it; that those promises will also be kept in the face of sin is a corollary and subplot to the main movement. The doubt is never, in Judaism, about whether God will abandon them in anger over sin; doubt is rather about whether God will keep faith in the face of enemies and difficulties, from Babylon to the Holocaust, and Jews are so bold, in the Psalms, as simply to hold God to account for those promises. 61 For Gentiles, redemption is the plot, consummation the denouement; for Jews consummation is the main plot, redemption the subplot, the outcome of which is never in real doubt. So redemption is the wrong main model for the election of Israel, but consummation is. So too consummation belongs to the work we appropriate to the Spirit: the work of glorifying and celebrating the goodness of God, as Jews teach Christians to do, and by which Christians believe we are ourselves caught up into the Spirit's office of doing that also within the trinitarian communion. They are not two stories, much less two covenants, but two ways the Spirit excites gratitude for the blessings of Abraham in the readers of the bible, who in this too can become sources of mutual blessing one for the other.
To use the words in their narrower senses, this means too that Barth's exegesis needs supplementation with pneumatologically concrete forms in addition to typology, where "typology" means to take biblical and extra-biblical events in reference specifically to Christ.
That is to admit that there is something a little funny about talking of a typology of the Spirit. But to say that Israel and the Church are types of the community of God in the world to come, and to say that the main plot of God's story with Israel is one of consummation, into which, as subplot, the Gentiles get eschatologically engrafted by redemption, is to talk about an exegetical procedure forgotten in Protestantism, even by Barth, except among the traditionally black churches: that of anagogy.
Barth's critique of prior theology, especially of the Reformation, proceeded by recovering a precritical mode of exegesis that related biblical and extra-biblical figures to Christ, namely typology. Barth might have recovered another, distinct pre-critical mode of exegesis for relating Biblical and extra-Biblical realities to their existence in and before the triune God. There are more ways of being trinitarianly concrete than typology. Classically, anagogy related realities on earth to realities in heaven, the church militant to the church triumphant. Like pneumatology, anagogy does not solve problems straightforwardly. Earlier anagogical exegesis was shot through with anti-Judaism. But it provides a fitting arena for die Anstrengung des Begriffs. It can improve upon typology for the concrete representation of Jews and gender in theology for three reasons.
1. Typology typically relates individual figures to Christ; anagogy typically relates groups on earth to groups in heaven; although theology does need to speak of Adam and Israel as concrete types of Christ, it needs additionally to acknowledge women, men, and Jews as concrete groups. Speaking of women and men as anagogically concrete will differ from treating them as statistical cohorts; men can participate in female anagogues, such as the church, and women can participate in male anagogues, such as Christ.
2. Typology tends to relate individual figures to Christ's work as accomplished once and for all; anagogy supplements typology by relating groups to the Holy Spirit's work as ongoing; and therefore anagogy is particularly appropriate when the churches wonder whether the Spirit is trying to stir them further with respect to women or Jews.
3. Typology belongs especially to the order of redemption, but anagogy especially to the order of consummation; therefore, anagogy is particularly appropriate in reading Jews and Gentiles as somehow both heirs to the one covenant with Abraham that through him all the nations of the earth would bless themselves, or in reading women and men in terms of the wedding of the lamb: because both those images are eschatological images, images of a consummation in which human beings, especially in the groups now marked by hostility, actually become the occasions of mutual blessing that God is in the life of the Trinity, and so come finally to share in the trinitarian life, participants by the Spirit of adoption in the divine nature.
To affirm, furthermore, that prophetic words are anagogues of the last judgment-which is clearly the case in most New Testament prophecy, such as the synoptic apocalypse in Mark 13 and parallels, and in Revelation-is also to contextualize (if not deny) Barth's notion that they are types of the crucifixion, and therefore of God's justification of sinners in Christ's atoning work. As anagogues of God's judgment, they belong rather to God's call of sinners into a holy community with God, a heavenly city, a new Jerusalem. The "new Jerusalem," anagogical language par excellence, confirms the role of Israel in prefiguring the consummation of God with us.
But that is what Barth would call the coming human being, not the passing one: his identification of Israel with the passing form has rendered him tone deaf about how Israel still has something that the Church needs.
What Jews have that Christians lack is a straightforward although not uncomplicated relation to God in the covenant, so that as Barth insisted they are "all of them by nature sanctified by Him, sanctified as ancestors and kin of the Holy One in Israel, in a sense that Gentiles are not by nature" (CD II/2, 287). Barth could do that insight more justice. The language of the passing form obscures it. Barth might have learned from Rosenzweig too that "luáaios nascitur, Christianus fit," or to put it in Pauline language, that Jews are "naturally" children of God, and Gentiles are made children of God by adoption, or, more strikingly, "contrary to nature" (para phusin, Rom. 11:24), by engrafting. Now that most Christians are Gentiles, Barth might have supposed that until the eschaton the Holy Spirit is keeping identifiable Jews apart from the Christian community so that they will not be swallowed up in Gentileness-and so that, more important, Gentile Christians will learn that they are Goyim. 62 Almost all Christians-Gentile ones-need to learn that life with God is not their due reward, not their natural possession, not theirs to demand or extort, and they can learn that perhaps best by learning that others have a prior claim, others are God's first love, 63 others have become (also by grace) God's quasi natural family. Almost all Christians need to learn to see themselves as Gentiles whose baptism washes away their lack of relation to the promises of Israel. 64 They do not need to learn to see Jews as disobedient proto-Christians. If the Jews, as Barth sees, are the "horizon" of the Gentiles, and if the Gentiles, therefore, are defined in terms of their lack over against the Jews, then Barth might have spoken of the Jews, too, as humanity's coming form. That Barth does speak that way of Jewish Christians does not succeed in teaching the vast majority of Christians who are Gentiles that Gentileness, originally marked by idol worship and a lack of relationship with the God of Israel, is also humanity's passing form. What passes away for Gentiles is God's continuing threat to cut off again the engrafted branches (Rom. 11 :22) . What comes is unended life with the God of Israel. The doctrine of election is the sum of the gospel precisely if it teaches us this: that the God of Israel is for the Gentile too the One who loves in freedom.
The eschatological community where Christians learn to see themselves as possessing no God of their own, but as brought by sheer grace into the worship of the God of the Jews, 65 would lead to a doctrine of the election of the community to which the Holy Spirit calls us. Unlike most Protestants, Barth has a rich doctrine of vocation, which Catholics might call glorification or Orthodox deification. He might have built his doctrine of election on that model. Nevertheless, there is one passage in which he glimpses the possibility, one passage in which he sees that the problem for overwhelmingly Gentile Christians is less the justification of the Jews, than the vocation of the Gentiles. The reversal is typically Barthian. Would that it had come sooner. In commenting on the unity of the community of God, Barth adverts, as we have seen, to the unity to which the Spirit calls it:
[ The whole doctrine of election needs to be recast on that basis. Persecution too belongs to humanity's passing form, and not because it is Jewish! Two features of the passage call for comment.
On the one hand, it would make a much more promising start for the doctrine of the election of the community than the one that Barth in fact adopts, open as it is to vocation and thus, implicitly, to Spirit and anagogy, and willing, by the end, to raise the Christian question, the Church question. Under that rubric much of the doctrine of justification could still be mined, only explicitly this time as the question of "the life of the community before the Jews." That puts Jews in the position of judging, which does not avoid but revitalizes Barth's use of christocentric typology. Seeing the Jews as judges is both typologically and anagogically apt. Christians might then tremble before the prospect that Jesus Christ was not only "born" a Jew.
Beside the implicit notion that Jews judge the church, on the other hand, stands the explicit notion that the Church calls "the Jew." Barth has still to state what the logic of his paragraph implies, that the Holy Spirit calls the Church, and that their work cannot be identified precisely when the Church stands under the judgment of another, or when one part of the community of God, the mostly Gentile Christian part, stands under the judgment of the Messiah for its sins against another part of the community of God, the Jewish part. On Barth's own grounds the call of the Spirit ought not to be identified with that of the community, when the community itself lacks the marks of the Spirit in justice and unity. When the Church finally calls "the Jew," it will be the last judge who comes.
Now I turn to a second and parallel case of Barth's erecting a screen on which he can project an abstraction and conceal multiple particulars, all because it is a screen that attempts to prevent the Holy Spirit from blowing where it will-especially from the other side of the screen.
Unintended Abstraction in Barth's Doctrine of Co-humanity
Barth's exegesis of the image of God in the human being as explicated by a man-woman pair occurs in §41.2-3 (CD III/l, 94-329). The section as a whole is very beautiful: Creation is the external basis of the covenant, the covenant the internal basis of creation. Nothing is wrong with analogizing the marriage covenant with the divine-human covenant. The one flesh, says Barth, "has its frontiers in a very different beginning and end, where Yahweh and His people are together ... One flesh'" (CD III/l, 315). Similarly, "Love and marriage ... become to them in some sense irresistibly a parable and sign of the link which Yahweh has established between Himself and His people, which in His eternal faithfulness He has determined to keep, and which He for His part has continually renewed" (CD III/l, 315). And the analogy goes in the right direction: God's love and primary analogate, human love the secondary: "Because the election of God is real, there is such a thing as love and marriage" (CD III/l, 318). But Barth overstates the case. So we get assertions like this: "Man is no longer single but a couple" (CD III/l, 308). "As there is no abstract manhood, there is no abstract womanhood. The only real humanity is that which for the woman consists in being the wife of a male and therefore the wife of man" (CD III/l, 309). Furthermore, the duality is "unequal" (CD III/l, 288) and in an order in which man is A and woman Β (CD III/4,168ff.).
Barth's use of I-Thou categories begins at CD III/4, 290 and appears again in §45, the Leitsatz for which reads, "creaturely being is a being in encounter-between I and Thou, man and woman" (CD III/2, 203; esp. also 244-274). That I-Thou categories are made for projection Barth had certainly learned from Feuerbach's use of them to argue that the divine Thou is just a projection of human need; they form a recurrent theme of Feuerbach's The Essence of Christianity, analyzed in Barth's introduction. 66 It should come as no surprise, then, if Barth resists projecting the desire of man onto God, only to project the desire of man onto woman, in calling "wirklich" an Edenic man-woman pair that Genesis refrains from portraying in act. Barth takes what is essentially a phenomenological category, which in Buber's version can support an I-Thou encounter with a tree, 67 and uses it to express, import, or smuggle in a paradigm. Man and woman do not relate as I and Thou phenomenologically; they relate as a model of co-humanity, its "basic form" ( §45.2, esp. CD II/2,250-274). "Being in encounter is (1) a being in which one human being looks the other in the eye" (CD III/2,250). "Being in encounter consists (2) in the fact that there is mutual speech and hearing" (252, my italics). "Being an encounter consists (3) in that we render mutual assistance in the act of being" (260, my italics). "But being in encounter consists (4) in the fact that all the occurrence which we have so far described as the basic form of humanity stands under the sign that it is done on both sides with gladness" (265). One may have no quarrel with those theses and yet observe that (1) they end up treating the I-Thou encounter, whether intentionally or surreptitiously, as if it led to a model "relationship" and (2) Adam and Eve do not, in fact, act in Genesis as those in a model relationship-although others in the bible may come closer. Adam and Eve experience their failure under precisely the categories in which Barth projects their unrecorded success-a projection, despite attempts and disclaimers aimed at "Wirklichkeit," that proves almost as romantic as similar projections in Goethe or Schleiermacher or Feuerbach-precisely in their looking each other in the eye, in their mutual speaking and hearing, in their mutual assistance, and in their gladness. It is precisely in those respects that, according to the Bible, they fail as soon as they act.
In giving woman a constitutive, structural role in the human creature rather than seeing her as, say, a defective man, Barth did better than predecessors with whom he was in conversation, and even his refusal to explicate man-woman in terms of strength-weakness looks less as if he is dignifying that explanation by mentioning it, than that he is countering ideas all too current in 1940s Switzerland.
I pass over much that is good and innovative in §45 of the Dogmatics-like Barth's decision to treat our humanity as something ontologically good from which sin cannot alienate us, or the decision to relate creation as outer to covenant as inner ground so that the two resist any attempt to separate them. Rather I go on here to pursue questions raised by Barth's own best lights. I look at biblical narratives that appear to provide richer resources for what Barth treats in §45 and that might well have led him to modify his views.
Despite the distinctions assayed in §45.1, "Jesus, Human Being for Other Human Beings," in §45.2, "The Basic Form of Humanity," Barth wanders from the christocentric focus on which in §43 he had set his gaze. §45.1 does do the service of reversing Feuerbach's thesis that God is the human being in a loud voice; rather God is the human being in Jesus concretely. But §45.2, despite disclaimers (222-228), leaves Jesus out of the "basic form." That much shows up already in the boldface thesis statements or Leitsätze of the two sections:
[ §43] As the human creature [der Mensch] Jesus is Himself the revealing Word of God, He is the source of our knowledge of the nature of the human creature as created by God.
[ §45] That the real human creature [der wirkliche Mensch] is determined by God for life with God has its inviolable correspondence in the fact that its creaturely being is a being in encounter-between I and Thou, man and woman. It is human in this encounter, and in this humanity it is a likeness of the being of its Creator and a being in hope in Him.
A number of gaps open up in Barth's exposition. Not that we expect him to deduce the nature of the human creature simply from the humanity of God in Jesus Christ: that possibility he has already excluded. Nor that we could deny him a priori the use of I-Thou or even man-woman categories. They have their proper use and service. Rather, more modest questions arise.
1. As dualistic, I-Thou categories fall short prima facie of likeness to the triunity of the creator. They pay too little attention to the work of the Holy Spirit, not easily reducible as a Thou, or even, as Barth might have learned from Schleiermacher, to the social character of God's relationships with God's creatures in Israel and the Church. Despite the suggestive bridal imagery, which serves another purpose, God's relationship to Israel and the Church resists reduction to I-Thou (in the singular) but may resemble I-Ye (in the plural). Otherwise the Godgiven and Spirit-consummated particularity of the biblical and post-biblical saints gets washed out.
That modification would open the way for Barth to set communal, ecclesial, and anagogical rather than the surreptitiously or openly phenomenological categories of I-Thou to work. Jesus worked not only one-on-one but often, perhaps even primarily with groups-the disciples, the crowds, the children. In the healings, one gets as close as may be to an authentically biblical approach to the "looking in the eye" and the "speaking and hearkening" under which Barth seeks to describe the relationship of an I and a Thou, but even there the approach to the I-Thou category is reductive: they always take place in and for the benefit also of a larger group. The IThou phenomenology tends to reduce co-humanity to co-individuality and wash out the ecclesial nature of the biblical healing stories, which appears signally in the story of the paralytic lowered through the roof. He gets healed and has his sins forgiven on account of the faith of others: "And when Jesus saw their faith, he said to the paralytic, 'My child, your sins are forgiven'" (Mk. 2:5, my italics). Among New Testament illustrations of those relationships, Barth might have noticed that I-Thou categories systematically hide the presence of third parties and ecclesial mediation: disciples, crowds, friends. The sick are always being brought or even recommended from a distance to Jesus by mediating others. This is the sort of work that trinitarian thinking appropriates to the Spirit. Christ promises to be with human beings not each individually that we might meet him as I and Thou, but when two or three are already gathered in his name. Thus the first gap: the I-Thou phenomenology of Barth's anthropology stands in great potential tension with his commitments to bible, trinity, and church.
2. The gap between an I-Thou form and its male-female instantiation yawns particularly wide because it reduces, perhaps even resists the pattern of I-Thou relationships that the bible in both the Old Testament and the New typically holds out to us. Of course, the I-Thou category serves not only to counter individualistic definition of the human creature that infect the Enlightenment generally and reach their reductio ad absurdum in Nietzsche's Zarathustra, but also to exclude them in advance. And the man-woman division makes an elegant strong reading of the Genesis passage, taking seriously God's observation that Adam should not be alone. It proceeds, however-in rather too much faith, hope, and charity-to overlook the possibility that Adam and Eve, as soon as Genesis shows them acting and therefore being concretely, each treat the other less as Thou than as It.
In Gen. 1:26-29 God makes Adam, male and female, in God's image and gives them dominion over the rest of creation. From that passage we cannot determine whether woman and man correspond to God's image separately or together. For as soon as they act, they sin. Their "concrete" relation does not tell us about the Unfällen image. They may bear the image complementarity or distributively; no unsinful action tells us. To discover how the image actually works, Barth would say, we must turn to Jesus Christ. But his example would hardly lead us to the conclusion that the co-humanity he exemplifies takes man-woman pairs as paradigm cases of I and Thou. If so, then Jesus shows us a deficient case of the image, not its fullness-which is absurd. That point holds even if one argues that it was Jesus's peculiar vocation that prevented him from marrying. The absurd conclusion would still follow that if it takes a man-woman pair to exhibit the fullness of the image, then Jesus, precisely because of his vocation, provides a deficient case of the image he came to renew. Then Jesus is a failure, not a savior.
In Genesis 2:6-8 and 15-25 we find nothing to indicate that an I-Thou relationship, if it exists, has anything to do with their sex. In 2:18 we learn that Adam needs a helper; in 2:24 that a husband and wife become one flesh; in 2:25 that the man and the woman were not ashamed. As soon as the man and the woman begin to interact they support each other in disobedience and deceit. Indeed, the man and the woman as interacting partners do nothing-nothing at all-until Genesis 3. What the man says in recognition of the woman while she still lies there does not count as the sort of interaction Barth needs. In reading Genesis 2 apart from Genesis 3, Barth removes being from history, just as he removes Israel from history. Furthermore, Barth misses the irony that accrues to Genesis 2 in Genesis 3. 68 "One flesh" turns out, ironically enough, to suffer the gloss, "eating the same fruit." Being a "fit helper" turns out to mean that Eve bears the blame that also belongs to Adam. "Not being ashamed" turns out to mean having eyes still closed. This is not the Gnostic reading that the fall was a good thing. It is the claim that Barth has missed the writer's or redactor's sense of irony and humor. The shared flesh the text names becomes that of the shared fruit. The helper becomes an accomplice. Their innocence gets explicated as closed eyes. These observations of the text do not denigrate the Edenic state, but they distance us from it with humor. Humor and irony depend upon distance and time and reflect, therefore, the work of the Spirit in bringing resurrection from death, good from evil, comedy from tragedy. But humor, and the Spirit, not represented in the dyad, are what Barth has missed in the story.
It is Barth's own emphasis on the phenomenology of "speaking and listening" and "looking the other in the eye" and of history (Geschichte) as an explication of being that alert us to these things. If Barth had turned to the concrete, biblical narratives (Geschichten) of human speaking and listening and of looking the other in the eye, instead of deploying them as the formal abstractions that he elsewhere deplores, he might have noticed that the very account he takes as paradigm for the I-Thou structure of actual human being employs them to mark it not as real (wirklich) but precisely as fallen. Granted, Barth like Thomas knows the value of ideal counterfactuals in theology; a prelapsarian analysis is licit and useful-but precisely not where the tools of analysis are rubrics like speaking and listening, looking each other in the eye-that the biblical Geschichte itself reserves for another, later, ironic purpose, the display of the posflapsarian state. For the first conversation that Genesis records takes place between Eve and the serpent, and the first possibility it records of man's and woman's openly looking each other in the eye comes only after they have eaten the fruit and results immediately in their sewing aprons together.
Thus Genesis 2 offers only empty forms (being abstracted from history) and Genesis 3 fills them only with ironic content (history separated from true being by sin), as Genesis uses the I-Thou categories that Barth suggests. Before the fall we have no history between Adam and Eve to tell us whether and how I-Thou categories apply; after the fall we have evidence only that they treat each other as Its. Even before the fall we ought to be suspicious; I-Thou categories imply that Adam and Eve are alone with each other, an isolated dyad, whereas in the story they emphatically are not. God the Spirit that broods over creation and brings it to consummation is walking in the Garden, and I-Thou categories crowd the Spirit out. Therefore, the creation story offers only superficial and ironizing support for the explication of I and Thou in terms of man and woman as such. Barth would have done better to follow his own advice and see the possibility of I-Thou not in the duality of the sexes but as the condition for the variety of relationships that Jesus Christ made concrete in New Testament story and Old Testament reference, relationships that are explicitly surrounded by a community and filled with the Spirit, and therefore resist dyadic reduction. Barth might have seen a foreshadowing of co-humanity in community and Spirit in the creation of the two, without turning male and female into ontological categories that make the humanity of Jesus deficient. The fact that Jesus is also God, or that for Barth we do not so much imitate as follow him at a distance, or that Jesus serves typologically as bridegroom of the Church do not grant him an exception to Barth's stronger statements, such as that the human being is "no longer single but a couple" (CD III/l, 308). Jesus is not a couple but single. That cannot be allowed to impugn his humanity-as Barth does not intend it to do.
Corollary: Barth on Homosexuality
Although Christian attitudes towards Jews and women are hardly settled, sexual orientation is currently sometimes a louder and more controverted a topic of debate. Religious people in moral quandaries about homosexuality appeal to thinkers like Barth when they want to honor their tradition in its most faithfully adequate and rationally sophisticated form. The exception proves the rule: a leading Jewish ethicist, David Novak, appeals to Barth's powerful reading of how the tradition opposes homosexual practice. He does so by claiming that Barth has in common with the rabbis the connection between homosexuality and idolatry, Paul in Romans 1 being the obvious link. 69 Oddly, the most important texts offer little support. Barth The ethics of the section "Man and Woman" ( §54.1), on the other hand, explicates the divine command in terms of the very abstractions we have been talking about, and against which Barth himself had fulminated decades earlier. Homosexuality turns out to be a matter of "a masculinity free from woman and a femininity free from man" (CD III/4,166). Granted, it would constitute a violation of co-humanity to uphold either "freedom from woman" or "freedom from man," which strictures would seem to rule out both permanent separatism and an all-male priesthood. But only the 19th C. romantic constructions of das Männliche and das Weibliche actually do the work here. It is true that Barth does quote Rom. 1:25-27 in his exposition. But it does him no work outside his abstractive categories. And there is no support in his more considered commentary, no mention of homosexuality at all, even as (or especially because) he follows Paul. If this is so, the tension will make Barth's pronouncements on homosexuality at once more complicated and more interesting for his religious admirers on both sides of the current debates.
The Holy Spirit Improves Barth's Doctrine of Co-humanity, Because Consummation is Appropriate to the Spirit
Consider the following speculations, which seem on the surface at least to hold some promise:
That the helping relationship should be a mutual being-with-the-other we learn first from Christ. We know it, Barth might better have said, in Christ's saying that "greater love has no one than this, than to lay down life for friends." We hear its promise, looking back, not between Adam and Eve. Neither of them lays down life for the other; rather Genesis has it that each leads the other into death. The old Adam, like the old Eve, does not foreshadow the new in being-withthe-other, but must be overcome. In fact, if we look for a typological foreshadowing of the Christ's laying down life for his friends of a covenantal sort, the bible does not present manwoman as the paradigm pair, but Ruth's words to Naomi: "Entreat me not to leave you or to return from following you: for where you go I will go, and where you lodge I will lodge: your people shall be my people, and your God my god: where you die I will die and there will I be buried. May the LORD do so to me and more also if even death parts me from you" (Ruth 1:16-17). That same-sex covenant, often quoted at weddings, is given priority over child-bearing when the women say, "your daughter-in-law who loves you is more than seven sons" (4:15), and over Ruth's seduction of Boaz, when their son is attributed to the mother-in-law: "a son has been born to Naomi" (4:17). Like the other "irregular" conceptions picked out by the inclusion of the mothers' names in Matthew's genealogy-Tamar, Rahab, Ruth, and "the wife of Uriah"-this one foreshadows the irregular conception of Jesus, who would, like Ruth, covenant his life for his friends.
That the one flesh serves not merely for the production of children for us, but, by the rigors of communal sanctification, for the production of children of God, we might better learn from Christ's addition (Mt. 10:9 and parallels) that God has joined it together. Genesis states only that the two become one flesh; in keeping with its ironic tone it refrains from ascribing the relationship that Adam and Eve are living out to God's doing. Christ's addition of divine agency represents the consummation of human nature that belongs less to nature as Adam and Eve exemplify it than to grace-as God, in the incarnation, proves able to use flesh, and even sexuality, for God's own purposes, namely the sanctification, in the asceticism of a common life, of the human being. 71 We recognize it, looking back, not between Adam and Eve, but perhaps in Hosea's reluctant loyalty to Gomer: "And the LORD said to me, 'Go again, love a woman who is beloved of a paramour and is an adulteress; even as the LORD loves the people of Israel, though they turn to other gods and love cakes of raisins.' So I bought her for fifteen shekels of silver and a homer and a lethech of barley" (Hos. 3:1-2). To define the one flesh in terms of Adam and Eve tends to make it work straightforwardly, instead of redemptively, ecclesially, and christologically, and therefore to conceal its theological function.
The right use of the shame that Genesis delights in linking with its first mention of their eyes we might better learn from Christ's warning that "whoever is ashamed of me and of my words in this adulterous and sinful generation, of that one will the Son of humanity also be ashamed." Right shame, christologically defined, is a matter of loyalty to the good in the face of sin, a sort of loyalty that Adam and Eve signally fail to show. Their loyalty after having led each other into sin and blamed each other is a matter of default, not virtue. Rather we recognize right shame in Jonathan's loyalty to David in the face of Saul's anger, where, so far from a man-woman context, his father appears to accuse him of a homosexual relationship, i.e., one that will not result in children, and Jonathan runs to David, kisses him, and takes on the role of a king's daughter in passing the succession to David and envisioning for himself the role of consort: " 'You son of a perverse, rebellious woman, do I not know you have chosen the son of Jesse to your own shame, and to the shame of your mother's nakedness?' ... and Jonathan rose from the table in fierce anger ... went out into the field to the appointment with David ... and they kissed one another, and wept with one another ... And he said to him, Tear not; for the hand of Saul my father shall not find you: you shall be king over Israel, and I shall be next to you'" (I Sam. 20: 30, 34, 35, 41; 23:17) .
Among illustrations of I-Thou relationships in what Jesus called Scripture Barth ought to have noticed that much better examples than Adam and Eve show up between Ruth and Naomi, Hosea and Gomer, Jonathan and David-with a striking lack of mutuality in the man-woman pair, even though it may constitute the best candidate for a covenantal I-Thou relationship among the Hebrew possibilities. If we are right to find those relationships better examples of Barth's own rubrics of "looking each other in the eye," "speaking and listening," "offering mutual assistance," and doing so with gladness; if we are right to find the Genesis author humoring and ironizing the relationship between Adam and Eve; and if we are right to worry that I-Thou categories in the case of Adam and Eve, although not in the case of Jesus, tend to crowd out the community and the Spirit; then we will find the paradigmatic expression of co-humanity as man-woman unbiblical, untrinitarian, and anti-ecclesial.
The kind of abstraction Barth avoids is an abstraction from Christ. The kind he commits is an abstraction from the Spirit. It is the Spirit to whom we appropriate the messiness of biblical histories, the ways in which God's work resists reduction to type, in which God's grace shows greater abundance (Rom. 5:12) and diversity (Heb. 1:1) than Barth gives it credit for. There is more even than Christ: the overplus is the Spirit, as Milbank has it, "a Trinitarianism without reserve." 71 The abstraction that Barth overcomes has reservations. God's work in the Spirit overcomes them. Thus in stories of praedestinatio gemina we read of third parties, not just two. Election always takes place concretely in a community and an environment. It is the community gathered by the Spirit; it is the environment that the Spirit creates, which is that of the Trinity projected onto creation. So too expressions of co-humanity. They too always take place in a community and an environment. They too, in biblical stories, involve more than binary typesmore than rejected-elected pairs, more than man-woman pairs-complications and concreteness that the Spirit can handle, if dialectic cannot. They too require the presence of others, like the witnesses at a marriage, the guests at a wedding feast, or the public at the pronouncing of a verdict, that do not fit neatly into I and Thou, but do correspond to the celebration by the Spirit of the love between the Father and the Son.
What about anagogy? Does the saying about Christ and the church lead to theologically justified speculation about women and men as organized groups in the community of God, the way Israel and the nations do? I can think of three proposals that tend in that direction. One is Paul Evdokimov's Woman and the Salvation of the World; another is Hans Urs von Balthasare Die Personen des Spiels; a third, by an anthropologist, is Mary Douglas's. 73 But none of these is persuasive. Evdokimov trades on too many ontological stereotypes, for all the surprising and eschatologically fruitful ways he uses them. Von Balthasar treats groups again as types-the Marian type, the Petrine type-and is not eschatological enough. Douglas's suggestion that the Catholic Church should set up a counter-hierarchy to the priesthood and episcopacy, made up of women, shows no chance of being adopted. Initially, the practice of anagogy for developing an exegesis about gender looks decidedly less promising than about Jews and Gentiles, even downright dangerous.
More is to be learned by looking into the actual practice of anagogy when it flourished, in the Middle Ages. The prime locus of anagogy was in fact about gender: it was the Song of Songs. Furthermore, after Genesis and the Psalms, the Song of Songs was the biblical book that attracted the most commentary among the books of the Hebrew Bible. 74 [T]he reasons why the erotic model of the love of God so appealed to the monastic commentator of the middle ages-and the vast majority of these commentators were monks-had to do with very fundamental preoccupations of the monastic theologian ... rooted in the monks' theological eschatology, in their sense that their life of partial withdrawal from the world situated them at a point of intersection between this world and the next, ... between anticipation and fulfillment. This meant that the concept of love as a "yearning" or "longing"-as an amor-desiderium, or, in Greek, eros, exactly expressed what they wanted by way of a language of love.
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How then do the speculations of monks apply to modern women and men, especially when monastic life and its influence has so drastically declined since the Reformation? The answer lies in recovering the sense in which the household is a little church, a little ascetic community-only to be hazarded because the wider church can save us from and redeem it 76 -so that marriage and monasticism share, not opposed, but the same ascetic end, sanctification by means of the body. Then marriage is not about satisfaction, but, precisely at its best, about yearning and anticipation of the satisfaction that it cannot provide. Anagogy then becomes a means for putting marriage into a new context, and recovering the insights of monasticism. Here Evdokimov has a very great deal to teach us, as does Zizioulas, with his ecclesial hypostasis of the person. 77 But that is a paper for another day.
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